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Adaptive behaviors increase the likelihood of survival and reproduction and improve the quality of life.
However, it is often difficult to identify optimal behaviors in real life due to the complexity of the decision
maker’s environment and social dynamics. As a result, although many different brain areas and circuits
are involved in decision making, evolutionary and learning solutions adopted by individual decision makers
sometimes produce suboptimal outcomes. Although these problems are exacerbated in numerous neurolog-
ical and psychiatric disorders, their underlying neurobiological causes remain incompletely understood. In
this review, theoretical frameworks in economics and machine learning and their applications in recent
behavioral and neurobiological studies are summarized. Examples of such applications in clinical domains
are also discussed for substance abuse, Parkinson’s disease, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder,
schizophrenia, mood disorders, and autism. Findings from these studies have begun to lay the foundations
necessary to improve diagnostics and treatment for various neurological and psychiatric disorders.Introduction
Decision making is an abstract term referring to the process of
selecting a particular option among a set of alternatives ex-
pected to produce different outcomes. Accordingly, it can be
used to describe an extremely broad range of behaviors, ranging
from various taxes of unicellular organisms to complex political
behaviors in human society. Until recently, two different
approaches have dominated the studies of decision making.
On the one hand, a normative or prescriptive approach
addresses the question of what is the best or optimal choice
for a given type of decision-making problem. For example, the
principle of utility maximization in economics and the concept
of equilibrium in the game theory describe how self-interested
rational agents should behave individually or in a group, respec-
tively (von Neumann andMorgenstern, 1944). On the other hand,
real behaviors of humans and animals seldommatch the predic-
tions of such normative theories. Thus, empirical studies seek to
identify a set of principles that can parsimoniously account for
the actual choices of humans and animals. For example, pros-
pect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) can predict not
only decisions of humans but also those of other animals more
accurately than normative theories (Brosnan et al., 2007; Laksh-
minaryanan et al., 2008; Santos and Hughes, 2009). Similarly,
empirical studies have demonstrated that humans often choose
their behaviors altruistically and thus deviate from the predic-
tions from the classical game theory (Camerer, 2003).
Recently, these two traditional approaches of decision-
making research have merged with two additional disciplines.
First, it is now increasingly appreciated that learning plays an
important role in decision making, although this has been
ignored in most economic theories. In particular, reinforcement
learning theory, originally rooted in psychological theories of
learning in animals (Mackintosh, 1974) and optimal control
theory (Bellman, 1957), provides a valuable framework to model
how decision-making strategies are tuned by experience (Sutton
and Barto, 1998). Second, and more importantly for the purposeof this review, researchers have begun to elucidate a number of
important core mechanisms in the brain responsible for various
computational steps of decision making and reinforcement
learning (Wang, 2008; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Lee et al.,
2012). Not surprisingly, economic and reinforcement learning
theories are now frequently featured in the neuroscience litera-
ture, and play an essential role in contemporary research on
the neural basis of decision making (Glimcher et al., 2009). Given
the wide range of decision-making problems, this neuroeco-
nomic research also finds its applications in many disciplines
in humanities and social sciences, including ethics (Farah,
2005), law (Zeki and Goodenough, 2004), and political science
(Kato et al., 2009).
An important lesson from neurobiological research on deci-
sion making is that actions are chosen through coordination
among multiple brain systems, each implementing a distinct
set of computational algorithms (Dayan et al., 2006; Rangel
et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2012; van der Meer et al., 2012; Delgado
and Dickerson, 2012). As a result, aberrant and maladaptive
decision making is common in many different types of neurolog-
ical and psychiatric disorders. Nevertheless, psychiatric condi-
tions are still diagnosed and treated according to schemes
largely based on symptom clustering (Hyman, 2007; Sharp
et al., 2012). Thus, as the neural underpinnings of decision mak-
ing are better elucidated, such knowledge has the increasing
potential to revolutionize the diagnosis and treatment of neuro-
logical and psychiatric disorders (Kishida et al., 2010; Maia and
Frank, 2011; Hasler, 2012; Montague et al., 2012; Redish, 2013).
A main purpose of this review is to exemplify the new insights
provided by recent applications of computational and neuroeco-
nomic research on decision making for improved characteriza-
tion of various neurological and psychiatric disorders. To this
end, the main theoretical frameworks used in neuroeconomic
research, such as prospect theory and reinforcement learning
theory, are briefly described. Next, our current knowledge of
the neural systems involved in valuation and reinforcementNeuron 78, April 24, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 233
Figure 1. Models of Decision Making
(A) Utility functions with different types of risk preference.
(B) Value functions in prospect theory. Solid (dotted) line shows the value function with (without) loss aversion.
(C) Exponential versus hyperbolic temporal discount functions.
(D) Weights assigned to the previous outcomes at different time lags according to two different learning rates (a) in a model-free reinforcement learning algorithm.
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nomic approaches have begun to reshape our understanding
of neurobiological changes associated with different types of
neurological and psychiatric disorders. The paper concludes
with several suggestions for future research.
Economic Decision Making
Decision Making under Risk
In economics, utility refers to the strength of a decision maker’s
preference for a particular option. When the preference of a
decision maker between different outcomes satisfies a certain
set of properties, such as transitivity, the utility of a given option
can be expressed as a real number. In addition, when the
outcomes of a choice are uncertain, its utility can be computed
as the average of the utilities of different outcomes weighted
by their probabilities, and is referred to as expected utility (von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). In this framework, the shape
of the utility function determines the decision maker’s attitude
toward uncertainty or risk. For example, when the utility function
increases linearly with the quantity of a particular good, such as
money, the decision maker would be indifferent between the
certainty of receiving x and the chance of doubling x or getting
nothing with equal probabilities. Such a decision maker is
referred to as risk-neutral. In contrast, when the utility function
is concave and has a negative second derivative, this implies
that the utility of getting x is less than twice the utility of getting
x/2, and therefore, this person would avoid the same gamble
and is referred to as risk averse (Figure 1A).
A decision maker whose choices are consistent with the
principle of maximizing expected utilities is considered rational,
regardless of his or her attitude toward risk. Therefore, for
rational decision makers, only the probabilities and utilities of
different outcomes should influence their choices. However,
choices of human decision makers are influenced by other
contextual factors, such as the status quo, and different
outcomes are weighted by quantities only loosely related to
probabilities. In prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979), the desirability of a decision outcome is determined by
its deviation from a reference point. The precise location of the
reference point can change depending on the description of234 Neuron 78, April 24, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.alternative options, and gains and losses from this reference
point are evaluated differently by the so-called value function
(Figure 1B). In fact, the term ‘‘value’’ is used somewhat more
loosely even when preference does not satisfy the formal defini-
tion of utility. In prospect theory, the value function is concave for
gains and convex for losses, accounting for the empirical find-
ings that humans are risk-averse and risk-seeking for gains
and losses, respectively. Namely, most people would prefer a
sure gain of $1,000 to a 50% chance of gaining $2,000, while
preferring a 50% chance of losing $2,000 to a sure loss of
$1,000. In addition, the slope of the value function near the
reference point is approximately twice as large for losses than
for gains. This accounts for the fact that humans are often
more sensitive to a loss than a gain of the same magnitude,
which is referred to as loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman,
1992). Another deficiency in expected utility theory is that in
real life, the exact probabilities of different outcomes from a
particular choice are often unknown. This type of uncertainty is
referred to as ambiguity. The term ambiguity aversion is often
used to describe the tendency to avoid an option for which the
exact probabilities of different outcomes are not known
(Camerer and Weber, 1992).
Intertemporal Choice
For practically all decisions made in real life, reward from chosen
actions become available after substantial delays. Faced with a
choice between a small but immediate reward and a larger but
more delayed reward, humans and animals tend to prefer the
smaller reward if the difference in the reward magnitude is suffi-
ciently small or if the delay for the larger reward is too long. This
implies that the utility for a delayed reward decreases with the
duration of its delay. Formally, a discount function is defined as
the fraction of the utility for delayed reward relative to that of
the same reward without any delay (Figure 1C). A discount func-
tion that decays steeply with reward delay corresponds to an
impatient or impulsive decision maker who assigns a large
weight to an immediate reward. A variety of mathematical func-
tions have been proposed for discount functions, including an
exponential function (Samuelson, 1937). An important property
of an exponential discount function is that the rate of discounting
per unit length of time is constant. This implies that exponential
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maker prefers one of the two rewards expected after unequal
delays, the mere passage of time does not alter this preference.
However, the majority of empirical studies in humans and
animals found that discount rate decreases for long delays
(Mazur, 2000). This can be modeled more accurately by hyper-
bolic or quasihyperbolic discount functions (Green andMyerson,
2004; Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997; Hwang et al.,
2009; Figure 1C). Compared to the exponential discount func-
tion, hyperbolic discount functions imply that decision makers
are particularly attracted to the immediate reward with no delay
(Figure 1C), although the same person might prefer a larger and
more delayed reward if some additional delays are added to both
options equally. This is referred to as preference reversal (Strotz,
1955–1956).
Although the framework of temporal discounting has been
influential, there are some limitations. First, there are cases in
which humans display negative time preference, namely, the
value of an outcome increases when it is delayed (Loewenstein,
1987). For example, some people prefer to obtain a kiss from
their favorite movie stars after a delay than immediately, sug-
gesting that they might derive some satisfaction from the antic-
ipation of pleasurable future outcomes. Similarly, some people
prefer to experience painful events sooner rather than later
(Berns et al., 2006). Second, when people choose between
two different sequences of outcomes, the overall utility of a
particular outcome sequence may not correspond to the sum
of the discounted utilities of individual outcomes. Instead, human
decision makers tend to prefer a sequence of outcomes that
improve over time (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1993).
Neural Encoding of Utilities and Values
Brain areas involved in decision making must contain signals
related to utilities or values of alternative options. A number of
studies using neuroimaging and single-neuron recording
methods have found that such quantities are encoded in multiple
brain regions during decision making involving uncertain out-
comes. For example, neurons modulating their activity accord-
ing to the expected value of reward available from a particular
target location are found in the basal ganglia (Samejima et al.,
2005), posterior parietal cortex (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Dorris
and Glimcher, 2004; Sugrue et al., 2004; Seo et al., 2009; Louie
et al., 2011), premotor cortex (Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011),
and medial prefrontal cortex (Sohn and Lee, 2007; Seo and
Lee, 2009; So and Stuphorn, 2010). Many of these brain areas
might in fact encode the signals related to utilities of reward ex-
pected from specific actions, even when the probabilities and
timing of reward vary. For example, temporally discounted
values are encoded by neurons in the prefrontal cortex (Kim
et al., 2008), posterior parietal cortex (Louie and Glimcher,
2010), and the striatum (Cai et al., 2011).
Human neuroimaging experiments have also identified signals
related to utilities in multiple brain areas, including the ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and ventral striatum (Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005; Knutson et al., 2005; Knutson et al., 2007;
Luhmann et al., 2008; Chib et al., 2009; Levy et al., 2011). Consis-
tent with the results from single-neuron recording studies (Sohn
and Lee, 2007), signals related to values of reward expected
from specific motor actions have been identified in the humansupplementary motor area (Wunderlich et al., 2009). Activity in
the VMPFC and ventral striatum display additional characteris-
tics of value signals used for decision making. For example,
the activity in each of these areas is influenced oppositely by ex-
pected gains and losses. In addition, activity in these areas is
more enhanced for expected losses than for expected gains,
and this difference is related to the level of loss aversion across
individuals (Tom et al., 2007). Activity in the VMPFC and ventral
striatum also reflects temporally discounted values for delayed
reward during inter-temporal choice (Kable and Glimcher,
2007; Pine et al., 2009). Results from neuroimaging and lesion
studies also suggest that the amygdala might play a role in esti-
mating value functions according to potential losses. For
example, activity in the amygdala changes according to whether
a particular outcome is framed as a gain or a loss (De Martino
et al., 2006), and loss aversion is abolished in patients with focal
lesions in the amygdala (De Martino et al., 2010).
Whether decisions are based on values computed for specific
goods or their locations, and which brain areas encode the value
signals actually used for action selection, might vary depending
on the nature of choices to be made (Lee et al., 2012). The
DLPFC might contribute to flexible switching between different
types of value signals used for decision making. This is possible,
since the DLPFC is connected with many other brain areas that
encode different types of value signals (Petrides and Pandya,
1984; Carmichael and Price, 1996; Miller and Cohen, 2001). In
addition, individual neurons in the DLPFC can modulate their
activity according to value signals associated with specific
objects as well as their locations (Kim et al., 2012b). In contrast,
neurons in the primate orbitofrontal cortex tend to encode the
signals related to utilities assigned to specific goods indepen-
dent of their locations (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006).
In addition to the desirability of expected outcomes, the likeli-
hood of choosing a particular action is also influenced by the
cost of performing that action. Although the activity of neurons
in the orbitofrontal cortex and striatum is often modulated by
multiple parameters of reward, the signals related to the cost
or efforts associated with a particular action might be processed
preferentially in the anterior cingulate cortex. This possibility is
consistent with the results from lesion studies (Walton et al.,
2003; Rudebeck et al., 2006), as well as single-neuron recording
and neuroimaging studies (Croxson et al., 2009; Kennerley et al.,
2009; Pre´vost et al., 2010; Hillman and Bilkey, 2010). However,
precisely how the information about the benefits and costs asso-
ciated with different options is integrated in the brain remains
poorly understood (Rushworth et al., 2011).
Reinforcement Learning
Multiple Systems for Reinforcement Learning
In most economic decision-making experiments conducted
in laboratories, subjects select from a small number of options
with relatively well-characterized outcomes. By contrast,
choices made in real life are more complex, and it is often neces-
sary tomake appropriate changes in our decision-making strate-
gies through experience. First, the likelihood that a particular
action would be chosen would change depending on whether
its previous outcome was reinforcing or punishing (Thorndike,
1911). Second, new information about the regularities in ourNeuron 78, April 24, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 235
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choices, evenwhen it is not directly related to reward or penalties
(Tolman, 1948). Reinforcement learning theory provides a
powerful framework to formalize how these two different kinds
of information can modify the values associated with alternative
actions (Sutton and Barto, 1998). In this framework, it is assumed
that the decision maker is fully knowledgeable about the current
state of his or her environment, which determines the outcome of
each action as well as the probability distribution of its future
states. This property is referred to as Markovian.
In reinforcement learning theory, a value function corresponds
to the decision maker’s subjective estimate for the long-term
benefits expected from being in a particular state or taking a
particular action in a particular state. These two different types
of value functions are referred to as state and action value
functions, respectively. Action value functions in reinforcement
learning theory play a role similar to that of utilities in economics,
but there are twomain differences. First, value functions are only
estimates, since they are continually adjusted according to the
decision maker’s experience. Second, value functions are
related to choices only probabilistically. This can be beneficial,
since such apparently suboptimal behaviors can eventually
increase the accuracy of value functions, thereby providing a
potential solution to the exploration-exploitation dilemma
(Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Value functions can be estimated according to several
different algorithms, which might be implemented by different
anatomical substrates in the brain (Daw et al., 2005; Dayan
et al., 2006; van der Meer et al., 2012). These different algorithms
are captured by animal learning theories. First, a sensory
stimulus (conditioned stimulus, CS) reliably predicting appetitive
or aversive outcome (unconditioned stimulus, US) eventually
acquires the ability to evoke a predetermined behavioral
response (conditioned response, CR) similar to the responses
originally triggered by the predicted stimulus (unconditioned
response, UR; Mackintosh, 1974). The strength of this associa-
tion can be referred to as the Pavlovian value of the CS (Dayan
et al., 2006). Second, during instrumental model-free reinforce-
ment learning, or simply habit learning, value function corre-
spond to the value of appetitive or aversive outcome expected
from an arbitrary action or its antecedent cues. Computationally,
these two types of learning can be described similarly using a
simple temporal difference (TD) learning algorithm, analogous
to the Rescorla-Wagner rule (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). In
both cases, value functions are adjusted according to the differ-
ence between the actual outcome and the outcome expected
from the current value functions. This difference is referred to
as the reward prediction error. In the case of Pavlovian learning,
the value function is updated for the action predetermined by the
US, whereas for habit learning, the value function is updated for
any arbitrary action chosen by the decision maker (Dayan et al.,
2006). The rate in which the reward prediction error is incorpo-
rated into the value function is controlled by a learning rate. A
small learning rate allows the decision maker to integrate the
outcomes from previous actions over a large time scale
(Figure 1D). Learning rates can be adjusted according to the
stability of the decision-making environment (Behrens et al.,
2007; Bernacchia et al., 2011).236 Neuron 78, April 24, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.Finally, when humans and animals acquire new information
about the properties of their environment, this knowledge can
be utilized to update the value functions for some actions and
improve decision-making strategies, without experiencing the
actual outcomes of their actions (Tolman, 1948). This is referred
to as model-based reinforcement learning, since the value func-
tions are updated by simulating the outcomes expected from
various actions using the decision maker’s internal or mental
model of the environment (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Doll et al.,
2012). Formally, the knowledge or model of the decision maker’s
environment can be captured by transition probabilities for the
environment to switch between two different states (Sutton
and Barto, 1998). Therefore, when the estimates of these transi-
tion probabilities are revised, the likelihood of different outcomes
expected from various actions can be recalculated, even if the
outcomes from all the states remain unchanged (Packard and
McGaugh, 1996). Similarly, if the subjective values of specific
outcomes change as a result of selective feeding or taste aver-
sion, the value functions for actions leading to those outcomes
can be revised without directly experiencing them (Holland and
Straub, 1979; Dickinson, 1985). Therefore, the choices predicted
by model-free and model-based reinforcement learning algo-
rithms, as well as their corresponding neural mechanisms, might
be different.
Neural Substrates of Model-free Reinforcement
Learning
As described above, errors in predicting affective outcomes,
namely, reward prediction errors, are postulated to drive
model-free reinforcement learning, including both Pavlovian
conditioning and habit learning. An important clue for the neural
mechanism of reinforcement learning was therefore provided by
the observation that the phasic activity of midbrain dopamine
neurons encodes the reward prediction error (Schultz, 1998).
Dopamine neurons innervate many different targets in the brain,
including the cerebral cortex (Lewis et al., 2001), striatum (Bolam
et al., 2000; Nicola et al., 2000), and amygdala (Sadikot and
Parent, 1990). In particular, the amygdala might be involved in
both fear conditioning (LeDoux, 2000) and appetitive Pavlovian
conditioning (Hatfield et al., 1996; Parkinson et al., 2000; Paton
et al., 2006). Induction of synaptic plasticity in the amygdala
that underlies Pavlovian conditioning might depend on the
activation of dopamine receptors (Guarraci et al., 1999; Bissie`re
et al., 2003). In addition, the ventral striatum also contributes to
several different forms of appetitive Pavlovian conditioning,
such as auto-shaping, conditioned place preference, and
second-order conditioning (Cardinal et al., 2002).
Given the increased range of actions controlled by habit
learning, the anatomical substrates for habit learning might be
more extensive compared to the areas related to Pavlovian con-
ditioning, and are likely to span both cortical and subcortical
areas. Nevertheless, the striatum has received much attention
due to its dense innervation by dopamine neurons (Houk et al.,
1995). The striatum integrates inputs from almost all cortical
areas, and influences the activity of neurons in the motor struc-
tures, such as the superior colliculus and pedunculopontine
nucleus, largely through disinhibitory mechanisms (Chevalier
and Deniau, 1990; Mink, 1996). In addition, striatal neurons in
the direct and indirect pathways express D1 and D2 dopamine
Figure 2. Ubiquitous Reward Signals in the
Brain
Brain areas encoding reward signals during a
matching pennies task that was identified with a
multivoxel pattern analysis (Vickery et al., 2011).
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basal ganglia antagonistically (Kravitz et al., 2010; Tai et al.,
2012; but see Cui et al., 2013). Dopamine-dependent, bidirec-
tional modulation of corticostriatal synapses might provide the
biophysical substrates for integrating the reward prediction error
signals into value functions in the striatum (Shen et al., 2008;
Pawlak and Kerr, 2008; Wickens, 2009). Indeed, neurons in the
striatum often encode the value functions for specific actions
(Samejima et al., 2005; Lau and Glimcher, 2008; Cai et al.,
2011; Kim et al., 2009, 2013). In addition, signals necessary for
updating the value functions, including the value of the chosen
action and reward prediction errors, are also found in the stria-
tum (Kim et al., 2009; Oyama et al., 2010; Asaad and Eskandar,
2011). Moreover, the dorsolateral striatum, or the putamen,
might be particularly involved in controlling habitual motor
actions (Hikosaka et al., 1999; Tricomi et al., 2009). Although
the striatum is most commonly associated with model-free
reinforcement learning, additional brain areas are likely to be
involved in the process of updating action value functions,
depending on the specific type of value functions in question.
Indeed, signals related to value functions and reward prediction
errors are found in many different areas (Lee et al., 2012).
Similarly, using a multivariate decoding analysis, signals related
to rewarding and punishing outcomes can be decoded from the
majority of cortical and subcortical areas (Figure 2; Vickery et al.,
2011).
Neural Substrates for Model-Based Reinforcement
Learning
The neural substrates for model-based reinforcement learning
are much less well understood compared to those for Pavlovian
conditioning and habit learning (Doll et al., 2012). This is not
surprising, since the nature of computations for simulating the
possible outcomes and their neural implementations might
vary widely across various decision-making problems. For ex-
ample, separate regions of the frontal cortex and striatum in
the rodent brain might underlie model-based reinforcement
learning (place learning) and habit learning (response learning;
Tolman et al., 1946). In particular, lesions in the dorsolateral stria-
tum and infralimbic cortex impair habit learning, while lesions in
the dorsomedial striatum and prelimbic cortex impair model-
based reinforcement learning (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998;
Killcross and Coutureau, 2003; Yin and Knowlton, 2006). In addi-
tion, lesions or inactivation of the hippocampus suppresses the
strategies based on model-based reinforcement learning
(Packard et al., 1989; Packard and McGaugh, 1996).NeuronTo update the value functions inmodel-
based reinforcement learning, the new
information from the decision maker’s
environment needs to be combined with
the previous knowledge appropriately.
Encoding and updating the informationabout the decision maker’s environment might rely on the pre-
frontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex (Pan et al., 2008;
Gla¨scher et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2012). In addition, persistent
activity often observed in these cortical areas is likely to reflect
the computations related to reinforcement learning and decision
making in addition to working memory (Kim et al., 2008; Curtis
and Lee, 2010). Given that persistent activity in the prefrontal
cortex is strongly influenced by dopamine and norepinephrine
(Arnsten et al., 2012), prefrontal functions related to model-
based reinforcement learning might be regulated by these neu-
romodulators. The neural mechanisms of mental simulations
necessary for estimating the hypothetical outcomes predicted
from this new knowledge are also poorly understood, but might
include the hippocampus. For example, when the animal is at a
choice point during a maze learning task, activity of neurons in
the hippocampus briefly represents the potential goal locations,
which has been interpreted as a neural correlate of mental simu-
lation (Tolman, 1948; Johnson and Redish, 2007). In addition, the
orbitofrontal cortex might play an important role in selecting
actions according to the value functions estimated by model-
based reinforcement learning algorithms, when the subjective
values of expected outcomes change (Izquierdo et al., 2004;
Valentin et al., 2007).
Results from recent neuroimaging and neural recording
studies have also shown that the neural substrates involved in
updating value functions according to different reinforcement
learning algorithms might overlap substantially. For example,
reward prediction error signals encoded in the ventral striatum
reflect the estimates derived from both model-free and model-
based reinforcement learning algorithms (Lohrenz et al., 2007;
Daw et al., 2011; Wimmer et al., 2012). Single-neuron recording
studies in non-human primates have also found that signals
related to actual and simulated outcomes are often encoded
by the neurons in the same regions of the prefrontal cortex
(Hayden et al., 2009; Abe and Lee, 2011; Figure 3).
Mental Simulation and Default Network
Several cognitive processes closely related to episodic memory,
such as self-projection, episodic future thinking, mental time
travel, and scene construction (Atance and O’Neill, 2001;
Tulving, 2002; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Corballis, 2013),
might be involved in simulating the outcomes of hypothetical
actions. Common to all of these processes is the activation of
the memory traces relevant for predicting the likely outcomes
of potential actions in the present context. In addition, even
when possible outcomes are explicitly specified for each option,78, April 24, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 237
Figure 3. Hypothetical Outcome Signals in the Orbitofrontal Cortex
(A) Visual stimuli displayed during the choice and feedback epochs of a rock-paper-scissors task used in Abe and Lee (2011). Different colors for feedback stimuli
were associated with different amounts of juice reward.
(B) Payoff matrix (left) and changes in choice probabilities (right) during the same task (R, rock; P, paper; S, scissors). Dotted lines correspond to the
Nash-equilibrium strategy (0.5 for rock and 0.25 for paper and scissors, respectively).
(C) Activity of a neuron in the orbitofrontal cortex that encoded the hypothetical outcomes from unchosen actions. Spike density functions are plotted separately
according to the position (columns) and payoffs (line colors) of the winning target and the position of the target chosen by the animal (rows).
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might still rely on mental simulation. This might be particularly
true during intertemporal choice. In fact, imagining a future
planned event during intertemporal choice reduces the rate of
temporal discounting (Boyer, 2008; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2010).
It has been proposed that the computations involved in
episodic future thinking and mental time travel might be imple-
mented in the default network (Buckner and Carroll, 2007). The
default network refers to a set of brain areas that increase their
activity when the subjects are not engaged in a specific cognitive
task, such as during intertrial intervals, presumably reflecting the
activity related to more spontaneous cognitive processes. This
network includes the medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingu-
late cortex, and medial temporal lobe (Buckner et al., 2008).
Mental simulation of hypothetical outcomes might be an impor-
tant component of such spontaneous cognition. For example,
during intertemporal choice, the activity of the posterior cingu-
late cortex reflects the subjective values of delayed reward
(Kable and Glimcher, 2007). Moreover, activity in the posterior
cingulate cortex and hippocampus is higher during intertemporal
choice than during a similar decision-making task involving
uncertain outcomes without any delays (Luhmann et al., 2008;
Ballard and Knutson, 2009). The functional coupling between
the hippocampus and the anterior cingulate cortex is also
correlated with how much episodic future thinking affects the
preference for delayed reward (Peters and Bu¨chel, 2010).
Social Decision Making
The most complex and challenging forms of decision making
take place in a social context (Behrens et al., 2009; Seo and238 Neuron 78, April 24, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.Lee, 2012). During social interactions, outcomes are jointly
determined by the actions of multiple decision makers (or
players). In game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944), a set of strategies chosen by all players is referred to as
a Nash equilibrium, if none of the players can benefit from chang-
ing their strategies unilaterally (Nash, 1950). In such classical
game theoretic analyses, it is assumed that players pursue
only their self-interests and are not limited in their cognitive
abilities. In practice, these assumptions are often violated, and
choicesmade by humans tend to deviate fromNash equilibriums
(Camerer, 2003). Nevertheless, when the same games are
played repeatedly, strategies of decision makers tend to
approach the equilibriums (Figure 3B). Accordingly, iterative
games have been often used in laboratories as a test bed to
examine how humans and animalsmight improve their strategies
during social interactions. The results from these studies have
demonstrated that both humans and animals apply a combina-
tion of model-free and model-based reinforcement learning
algorithms (Camerer and Ho, 1999; Camerer, 2003; Lee, 2008;
Abe et al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2012).
Since the outcomes of social decision making depend on the
choices of others, model-based reinforcement learning during
social interactions requires accurate models of the strategies
used by other decision makers. The ability to make inferences
about the knowledge and beliefs of other decision-making
agents is referred to as the theory of mind (Premack and
Woodruff, 1978; Gallagher and Frith, 2003). Neural signals
necessary for updating the models of other players have been
identified in the brain areas implicated for the theory of mind,
such as the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and superior temporal
Figure 4. Functions and Dysfunctions of the
Default Network
(A–C) Cortical areas activated by the recall
of autobiographical memory (A), episodic future
thinking (B), and mental simulation of other
people’s perspective (C). Reproduced from
Buckner et al. (2008).
(D) Deactivation in the default network (blue, top) is
absent in the brains of autistic individuals (black
outlines, bottom; Kennedy et al., 2006).
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most cortical areas included in the default network are activated
similarly during the tasks related to episodic or autobiographical
memory, prospection, and theory of mind (Gusnard et al., 2001;
Spreng et al., 2009, Spreng and Grady, 2010; Figures 4A–4C),
although some brain areas might be more specifically related
to the theory of mind and other aspects of social cognition
(Rosenbaum et al., 2007; Spreng and Grady, 2010; Rabin
et al., 2010).
Suboptimal Decision Making in Mental Disorders
Computational and neurobiological studies on decision making
have begun to provide much insight into the neural mechanisms
that underlie suboptimal decision-making behaviors observed in
various psychiatric and neurological disorders. Since multiple
algorithms and brain systems are likely to be combined in a
flexible manner for optimal decision making according to the
demands of specific tasks, it would be challenging to charac-
terize the nature of decision-making deficits in different disorders
accurately. Econometric and reinforcement learning models are
therefore becoming valuable tools in a new area referred to as
computational psychiatry (Kishida et al., 2010; Maia and Frank,
2011; Hasler, 2012; Montague et al., 2012; Sharp et al., 2012;
Redish, 2013).
Substance Abuse
Many people continue to abuse addictive substances despite
their negative long-term consequences and a large cost on soci-
ety. Although addictive behaviors are likely to arise frommultiple
factors (Redish et al., 2008), they are often attributed to the
dopamine system and its role in impulsivity (Monterosso et al.,
2012). First, addictive drugs increase the level of dopamine in
the brain (Koob et al., 1998). Therefore, intake of the addictive
substance might provide undiminished signals related to posi-
tive reward prediction errors even after repeated drug use, which
would continuously strengthen the tendency of substance abuseNeuron(Everitt et al., 2001; Redish, 2004). How-
ever, contrary to the predictions of this
theory, animals can reduce their prefer-
ence for a particular action, when they
receive less cocaine than expected
(Marks et al., 2010), and conditioning
with cocaine can be blocked by another
stimulus already paired with cocaine
(Panlilio et al., 2007). Second, it has
been proposed that addicted individuals
become hypersensitive to the incentive
salience assigned to drug-related cues,and this so-called incentive sensitization might be mediated by
the action of dopamine in the ventral striatum (Robinson and
Berridge, 2003). Third, a low level of D2/D3 receptors has been
associated with a high level of impulsivity as well as the tendency
to develop habitual drug taking (Dalley et al., 2011).
An important factor contributing to substance abuse might be
abnormally steep temporal discounting (Kim and Lee, 2011).
Drug-users and alcoholics display steeper discounting during
intertemporal choice compared to normal controls (Madden
et al., 1997; Kirby et al., 1999; Coffey et al., 2003; de Wit,
2009; MacKillop et al., 2011). Steep temporal discounting might
facilitate drug use by reducing the weight given to its negative
long-term consequences. Consistent with this possibility, it has
been shown that rats with a steeper discounting function are
more likely to acquire cocaine self-administration (Perry et al.,
2005). In addition, the use of addictive drugs might also increase
the steepness of temporal discounting (Simon et al., 2007).
During intertemporal choice, a number of brain areas thought
to be important for attention and episodic memory, such as the
precuneus and anterior cingulate cortex, show reduced activa-
tion in methamphetamine-dependent individuals, suggesting
that the impaired functions of these brain areas might contribute
to more impulsive choices (Hoffman et al., 2008). Although
dopamine-related drugs have been shown to influence the
steepness of temporal discounting, the results from these
behavioral pharmacological studies have not been consistent
(Peters and Bu¨chel, 2011). As a result, the precise nature of
the neural mechanisms linking the use of addictive drugs and
temporal discounting needs to be examined more carefully.
Parkinson’s Disease
In patients with Parkinson’s disease, midbrain dopamine
neurons are lost progressively. Since these neurons are a major
source of inputs to the basal ganglia, motor deficits found in
Parkinson’s patients, such as bradykinesia, rigidity, and tremor,
are thought to result from the disruption in the disinhibitory78, April 24, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 239
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considering the extent to which dopamine neurons contribute
to the broad propagation of reward prediction signals in the
brain, abilities to improve decision-making strategies through
experience might be impaired in patients with Parkinson’s
disease. In fact, given the option of learning from positive or
negative outcomes of previous choices, Parkinson’s patients
tend to learn more from negative outcomes, and this tendency
was ameliorated by medication that increase dopamine levels
(Frank et al., 2004). Similarly, striatal activity correlated with
reward prediction errors was reduced in Parkinson’s patients
(Schonberg et al., 2010).
Medication that increases dopamine levels in Parkinson’s
patients is not likely to restore the normal pattern of dopamine
signals completely and therefore may cause a side-effect in
choice behaviors of treated patients. For example, Parkinson’s
patients often get addicted to the drugs used in dopamine
replacement therapy (Lawrence et al., 2003). Similar to the
mechanisms of other addictive drugs (Redish, 2004), this might
result from the amplification of reward prediction error signals,
since patients treated with dopaminergic drugs showed higher
learning rates during a dynamic foraging task (Rutledge et al.,
2009). Patients on dopamine replacement therapy also tend to
develop problems with behavioral addictions, such as patholog-
ical gambling (Driver-Dunckley et al., 2003; Dodd et al., 2005).
Previous studies have also found that compared to normal con-
trols, Parkinson’s patients tend to show steeper temporal dis-
counting during intertemporal choice (Housden et al., 2010;
Milenkova et al., 2011). As is the case for the relationship
between addiction and temporal discounting, whether and
how steeper temporal discounting in Parkinson’s disease is
mediated by dopaminergic signaling requires further study
(Dagher and Robbins, 2009).
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is characterized
by inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity. Although ADHD oc-
curs most frequently in school-age children, it can also be found
in adults, often in attenuated forms. At least two forms of impul-
sivity have been extensively documented for children and adults
with ADHD. First, children and adolescents with ADHD show
steeper temporal discounting than age-matched control
subjects (Rapport et al., 1986; Sonuga-Barke et al., 1992;
Schweitzer and Sulzer-Azaroff, 1995; Barkley et al., 2001) or
children with autism spectrum disorders (Demurie et al., 2012).
Second, individuals with ADHD also tend to display motor
impulsivity, and show impairments in suppressing undesirable
movements. In particular, during the stop-signal task, the
amount of time necessary for inhibitory signals to abort the
pre-plannedmovement, commonly referred to as the stop-signal
reaction time, increases in people with ADHD (Oosterlaan et al.,
1998; Aron et al., 2003; Verbruggen and Logan, 2008). The time
scale for common intertemporal choice often ranges from days
to months, whereas the relevant time scale for motor impulsivity
is usually less than a second. Despite this large difference in
time scale, both changes in temporal discounting and
increased motor impulsivity imply alterations in temporal pro-
cessing. Accordingly, it has been proposed that the behavioral
impairments in the ADHDmight result fundamentally from timing240 Neuron 78, April 24, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.deficits (Toplak et al., 2006; Rubia et al., 2009; Noreika et al.,
2013).
Neurochemically, ADHD might result from lower levels of
dopamine and/or norepinephrine in the brain (Volkow et al.,
2009; Arnsten and Pliszka, 2011). Accordingly, symptoms of
ADHD can often be ameliorated by stimulants, such as methyl-
phenidate, that increase the level of dopamine and norepineph-
rine (Gamo et al., 2010). For example, stimulant medication
decreased the steepness of temporal discounting in children
with ADHD (Shiels et al., 2009). In addition, the ability to suppress
preplanned but undesirable movements was enhanced by stim-
ulant medication during the stop signal task (Aron et al., 2003).
Currently, it remains uncertain whether these effects of medica-
tion used to treat ADHD on decision making and response inhi-
bition are mediated by dopaminergic or noradrenergic systems
(Gamo et al., 2010). Nonstimulant drugs that increase the level
of both dopamine and norepinephrine (Bymaster et al., 2002)
also improve response inhibition (Chamberlain et al., 2009). In
addition, administration of guanfacine, an agonist for a2 adren-
ergic receptors, diminishes the preference for immediate reward
during an intertemporal choice task in monkeys (Kim et al.,
2012a). Most of these drugs also tend to enhance task-related
activity in the prefrontal cortex during a working memory task
(Gamo et al., 2010), suggesting that the therapeutic effects of
ADHDmedication might bemediated by improving the functions
of the prefrontal cortex.
Schizophrenia
Often considered the most debilitating mental illness, schizo-
phrenia affects approximately 1% of the population across
different cultures, and is characterized by positive symptoms,
such as hallucinations and delusions, as well as negative symp-
toms, such as blunted affect, anhedonia, and lack of motivation
(Walker et al., 2004). Symptoms of schizophrenia have often
been linked to dopamine. In particular, patients with schizo-
phrenia show elevated levels of dopamine D2 receptors (Kestler
et al., 2001). Changes in other neurotransmitter systems, such as
reduced N-methyl-D-aspartic acid (NMDA) receptor functions,
are also implicated, but the precise manner in which multiple
neurotransmitter systems interact with one another in schizo-
phrenia still remains poorly understood (Krystal et al., 2003).
Neuropathological studies have documented loss of dendrites
and spines of pyramidal neurons (Selemon and Goldman-Rakic,
1999; Glantz and Lewis, 2000), and weaker GABAergic actions
needed to coordinate neural activity in the DLPFC (Lewis,
2012). In addition, although a large number of candidate genes
have been identified, how they are related to the pathophysi-
ology of schizophrenia is not well known. Nevertheless, many
of the genes implicated in schizophrenia, such as DISC1 (Bran-
don et al., 2009), are often linked to disorders in brain develop-
ment, suggesting that different stages of schizophrenia should
be understood as the trajectory of a neurodevelopmental disor-
der (Insel, 2010).
A number of cognitive functions, such as working memory and
cognitive control, are impaired in schizophrenia (Barch and
Ceaser, 2012). In addition to disrupted dopaminergic system,
dysfunctions of the prefrontal functions (Weinberger et al.,
1986) might also be responsible for changes in reinforcement
learning and decision-making strategies observed in patients
Neuron
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making tasks, patients with schizophrenia tend to assign less
weight to potential losses compared to healthy controls (Heerey
et al., 2008), and also display steeper discounting during
intertemporal choice (Heerey et al., 2007). Performance of
schizophrenia patients was not significantly different from con-
trol subjects during relatively simple associative learning task
(Corlett et al., 2007; Gradin et al., 2011). Nevertheless, several
studies have revealed impairments in feedback-based learning
in patients with schizophrenia (Waltz et al., 2007; Strauss et al.,
2011). In particular, the results from probabilistic go/no-go task
(Waltz et al., 2011) and a computer-simulated matching pennies
task (Kim et al., 2007) consistently showed that patients with
schizophrenia might be impaired in flexibly switching their
choices based on negative feedback and incrementally adjust-
ing their choices according to positive feedback across multiple
trials. Consistent with these behavioral results, activity related to
reward prediction error in the frontal cortex and striatum is atten-
uated in patients with schizophrenia (Corlett et al., 2007; Gradin
et al., 2011).
It has been proposed that insufficient suppression of the
default network or its hyperactivity might be related to positive
symptoms of schizophrenia, such as hallucination and paranoia
(Buckner et al., 2008; Anticevic et al., 2012). For example, the
amount of task-related suppression is reduced in some areas
of the default network (Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009; Anticevic
et al., 2013). Given a large overlap between the default network
and the brain areas involved in social cognition, hyperactivity, or
any abnormal activity patterns in the default network might also
underlie impairments in social functions among patients with
schizophrenia (Couture et al., 2006). In addition, psychotic
symptoms of schizophrenia tend to emerge after early adult-
hood, often many years after impaired cognitive functions can
be detected (Cornblatt et al., 1999; Cannon et al., 2000). This
is consistent with the hypothesis that clinical symptoms of
schizophrenia arise from malfunctions of the prefrontal cortex
and default network, since similar to the extended develop-
mental trajectory of the prefrontal cortex (Lewis, 2012), the func-
tional connectivity of the default network continues to increase
during adolescence (Fair et al., 2008). Therefore, it would be
important to test whether subjects at risk for schizophrenia are
impaired in tasks that require model-based reinforcement
learning.
Depression and Anxiety Disorders
Depression and anxiety disorder are both examples of internal-
izing disorders, namely, they are largely characterized by distur-
bances inmood and emotion (Kovacs andDevlin, 1998; Krueger,
1999). These two conditions show a high level of comorbidity
and are accompanied by poor concentration and negative
mood states, such as sadness and anger (Mineka et al., 1998).
Nevertheless, there are some important differences. Overall,
symptoms of anxiety are appropriate for preparing the affected
individuals for impending danger, whereas depression might
inhibit previously unsuccessful actions and facilitate more reflec-
tive cognitive processes (Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987).
Physiological arousal is an important feature of anxiety, whereas
anhedonia and reduced positive emotions occur in depression
(Mineka et al., 1998). Both depression and anxiety disordertend to introduce systematic biases in attentional andmnemonic
processes as well as decision making (Mineka et al., 1998;
Paulus and Yu, 2012). In particular, individuals with anxiety
disorders become hypersensitive to potentially threatening
cues without obvious memory bias. In contrast, depressed indi-
viduals show a bias to remember negative events (Matt et al.,
1992), and to ruminate excessively (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).
The possible neural changes responsible for the symptoms of
these two mood disorders have been extensively studied, and
some candidate brain systems have been identified. In partic-
ular, depression might be related to abnormalities in brain mono-
amines and frontostriatal systems involved in reinforcement
learning (Eshel and Roiser, 2010). On the other hand, the brain
areas implicated in anxiety disorders include the amygdala,
insula, and anterior cingulate cortex (Craske et al., 2009; Hartley
and Phelps, 2012). In addition, excessive rumination and nega-
tive self-referential memory observed in depressed individuals
might be linked to the function of the default network. Indeed,
the default network is overactive in individuals with depression
when they are evaluating emotional stimuli (Sheline et al.,
2009), and its activity is correlated with the level of depressive
rumination (Hamilton et al., 2011). To the extent that the default
network contributes to task-relevant mental simulation and
spontaneous cognition (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010), this might
also account for the fact that depressed individuals perform
better in sequential decision-making tasks and analytical
thinking (Andrews and Thomson, 2009; von Helversen et al.,
2011). Patients with depression display increased metabolic
activity in the subgenual cingulate cortex, and deep brain stimu-
lation of the same brain area produces therapeutic effects
(Mayberg et al., 2005). Therefore, the functional coupling
between the subgenual cingulate cortex and the default network
patients, which is greater in patients with depression (Greicius
et al., 2007), might correspond to the interface between exces-
sive self-referential thoughts and their negative emotional conse-
quences.
As reviewed recently (Paulus and Yu, 2012), a large number of
studies have examined the performance of individuals with
depression or anxiety during the Iowa gambling task (Bechara
et al., 1997), but the results from these studies were inconsistent.
Obtaining the best outcome during the Iowa gambling task
depends on a number of computationally distinct processes,
including reinforcement learning, risk preference, and loss
aversion (Fellows and Farah, 2005; Worthy et al., 2012). Under-
standing how each of these processes is influenced in
individuals with depression or anxiety therefore still remains an
important research area (Angie et al., 2011; Hartley and Phelps,
2012). The available results suggest that individuals with anxiety
disorders are more risk-averse than control subjects (Maner
et al., 2007), whereas the neural signals related to reinforcement
might be reduced, especially in the striatum, in depressed
individuals (Pizzagalli et al., 2009).
Although neurochemical basis of mood and anxiety disorders
remains poorly understood, much attention has been focused on
the possible role of altered serotonin metabolism in depression
(Dayan and Huys, 2009). For example, it has been hypothesized
that future reward might be discounted excessively in indi-
viduals with depression due to an abnormally low level ofNeuron 78, April 24, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 241
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late the subjective value of future reward might be controlled
by serotonin (Schweighofer et al., 2008). However, temporal dis-
counting might be less steep in individuals with high levels of
anhedonia (Lempert and Pizzagalli, 2010). Others have proposed
that serotonin is primarily involved in the inhibition of thoughts
and actions associated with aversive outcomes (Daw et al.,
2002), including the process of heuristically disregarding un-
promising branches of decision trees (Dayan and Huys, 2008;
Huys et al., 2012). According to this view, depressed individuals
would expect a lower rate of reward from their actions, because
insufficient serotonin would expose the negative outcomes of
potential actions that would be normally subject to pruning.
More research is needed, however, for understanding the nature
of neural processesmediating the effects of various neuromodu-
lators, such as serotonin, during decision making.
Autism
Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder, characterized by
impaired social cognition, poor communicative abilities, repeti-
tive behaviors, and narrow interests (Geschwind and Levitt,
2007). In particular, individuals with autism are impaired in their
ability to make inferences regarding the intentions and beliefs
of others, namely, theory of mind, as reflected in their poor per-
formance with the false-belief task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985;
Frith, 2001). Such reduced abilities to mentalize the intentions
of others might underlie differences in the strategies of autistic
individuals and control subjects during socially interactive deci-
sion-making tasks. For example, children with autism tend to
offer a smaller amount of money as proposers during the ultima-
tum game, and they are also more likely to accept even very
small offers as responders (Sally and Hill, 2006). In addition,
whereas control subjects donated more money to charity in
the presence of observers, this effect was absent in individuals
with autism (Izuma et al., 2011). Autistic individuals are also
impaired in their abilities to infer mentalizing strategies of others
(Yoshida et al., 2010). Some of these social impairments in
autism are ameliorated by oxytocin, but precisely how oxytocin
influences affective and social functions of the brain remains
poorly understood and must be more carefully characterized
(Yamasue et al., 2012).
Although autism has heterogeneous etiology, abnormality in
the long-range connections between different association
cortical areas is often considered important (Geschwind and
Levitt, 2007). Such anatomical changes might underlie reduced
inter-hemispheric synchronization in neural activity recorded
from toddlers with autism (Dinstein et al., 2011). Anatomical
and physiological abnormalities in autism might produce their
most prominent effect in the domain of social cognition. Consis-
tent with the possibility that the default network might be impor-
tant for mental simulation in social contexts, the default network
is hypoactive in individuals with autism (Figure 4B; Kennedy
et al., 2006). Moreover, functional connectivity among the brain
areas within the default network is reduced in autistic individuals
(Weng et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2011; Gotts et al., 2012).
Conclusion
Despite substantial progress in our scientific understanding of
psychiatric disorders, there are many challenges and unan-242 Neuron 78, April 24, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.swered questions. First, characterization of neural mechanisms
responsible for specific disorders is often hindered by the poten-
tial side-effects of medication and other treatment. This is partic-
ularly true for schizophrenia and mood disorders. Nevertheless,
similar problems occur in other conditions as well. For example,
the extent to which steep temporal discounting results from or
causes substance abuse and the mechanisms of such interac-
tions still remains poorly understood. Second, more rigorous
experiments are also required to understand how dysregulation
in various neuromodulator systems results in suboptimal and
sometimes abnormal parameters in decision making and rein-
forcement learning. Third, the function of the default network
needs to be better understood. The default network might be
hypoactive or hyperactive in various psychiatric disorders. How-
ever, the precise nature of computations implemented in these
brain areas remains unclear. In particular, how default network
activity is related to model-based reinforcement learning and
mental simulation and how its dysfunctions contribute to specific
symptoms remain important research questions.
The infusion of economic and machine learning framework
into neuroscience has led to the rapid advance in our under-
standing on the neural mechanisms for decision making and
reinforcement learning. Given that impaired decision making is
wide-spread and often the most prominent symptoms in
numerous psychiatric disorders, it is imperative for neuroscien-
tists and clinicians to combine their expertise to develop more
effective nosology and treatment. In the near future, we might
first expect to see more progress in disorders for which the
etiologies are better understood, such as substance abuse and
Parkinson’s disease. Eventually, however, the knowledge
gained from neuroscience must guide the search for the preven-
tion and cure of all psychiatric disorders.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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